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Do not guard waiting for encrypted signature with arbitrary timeout

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We already select waiting for this message with the cancellation expiry,
 we do not need add another guard that tries to guess how long it would
 for the Monero transaction to be finalised.
This commit is contained in:
Franck Royer 2021-01-07 11:53:07 +11:00
parent 95ecb02e7a
commit 17356eaff9
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: A82ED75A8DFC50A4
3 changed files with 6 additions and 29 deletions
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21
swap/src/config.rs
View File

@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ pub struct Config {
pub bob_time_to_act: Duration,
pub bitcoin_finality_confirmations: u32,
pub bitcoin_avg_block_time: Duration,
pub monero_max_finality_time: Duration,
pub monero_finality_confirmations: u32,
pub bitcoin_cancel_timelock: Timelock,
pub bitcoin_punish_timelock: Timelock,
@ -21,10 +20,6 @@ impl Config {
bob_time_to_act: *mainnet::BOB_TIME_TO_ACT,
bitcoin_finality_confirmations: mainnet::BITCOIN_FINALITY_CONFIRMATIONS,
bitcoin_avg_block_time: *mainnet::BITCOIN_AVG_BLOCK_TIME,
// We apply a scaling factor (1.5) so that the swap is not aborted when the
// blockchain is slow
monero_max_finality_time: (*mainnet::MONERO_AVG_BLOCK_TIME).mul_f64(1.5)
* mainnet::MONERO_FINALITY_CONFIRMATIONS,
monero_finality_confirmations: mainnet::MONERO_FINALITY_CONFIRMATIONS,
bitcoin_cancel_timelock: mainnet::BITCOIN_CANCEL_TIMELOCK,
bitcoin_punish_timelock: mainnet::BITCOIN_PUNISH_TIMELOCK,
@ -38,10 +33,6 @@ impl Config {
bob_time_to_act: *testnet::BOB_TIME_TO_ACT,
bitcoin_finality_confirmations: testnet::BITCOIN_FINALITY_CONFIRMATIONS,
bitcoin_avg_block_time: *testnet::BITCOIN_AVG_BLOCK_TIME,
// We apply a scaling factor (1.5) so that the swap is not aborted when the
// blockchain is slow
monero_max_finality_time: (*testnet::MONERO_AVG_BLOCK_TIME).mul_f64(1.5)
* testnet::MONERO_FINALITY_CONFIRMATIONS,
monero_finality_confirmations: testnet::MONERO_FINALITY_CONFIRMATIONS,
bitcoin_cancel_timelock: testnet::BITCOIN_CANCEL_TIMELOCK,
bitcoin_punish_timelock: testnet::BITCOIN_PUNISH_TIMELOCK,
@ -55,10 +46,6 @@ impl Config {
bob_time_to_act: *regtest::BOB_TIME_TO_ACT,
bitcoin_finality_confirmations: regtest::BITCOIN_FINALITY_CONFIRMATIONS,
bitcoin_avg_block_time: *regtest::BITCOIN_AVG_BLOCK_TIME,
// We apply a scaling factor (1.5) so that the swap is not aborted when the
// blockchain is slow
monero_max_finality_time: (*regtest::MONERO_AVG_BLOCK_TIME).mul_f64(1.5)
* regtest::MONERO_FINALITY_CONFIRMATIONS,
monero_finality_confirmations: regtest::MONERO_FINALITY_CONFIRMATIONS,
bitcoin_cancel_timelock: regtest::BITCOIN_CANCEL_TIMELOCK,
bitcoin_punish_timelock: regtest::BITCOIN_PUNISH_TIMELOCK,
@ -80,8 +67,6 @@ mod mainnet {
pub static MONERO_FINALITY_CONFIRMATIONS: u32 = 15;
pub static MONERO_AVG_BLOCK_TIME: Lazy<Duration> = Lazy::new(|| Duration::from_secs(2 * 60));
// Set to 12 hours, arbitrary value to be reviewed properly
pub static BITCOIN_CANCEL_TIMELOCK: Timelock = Timelock::new(72);
pub static BITCOIN_PUNISH_TIMELOCK: Timelock = Timelock::new(72);
@ -100,10 +85,6 @@ mod testnet {
// This does not reflect recommended values for mainnet!
pub static MONERO_FINALITY_CONFIRMATIONS: u32 = 5;
// The average blocktime on Monero stagenet is not as constant as on mainnet,
// hence 4 minutes it set
pub static MONERO_AVG_BLOCK_TIME: Lazy<Duration> = Lazy::new(|| Duration::from_secs(4 * 60));
// This does not reflect recommended values for mainnet!
pub static BITCOIN_CANCEL_TIMELOCK: Timelock = Timelock::new(6);
pub static BITCOIN_PUNISH_TIMELOCK: Timelock = Timelock::new(6);
@ -121,8 +102,6 @@ mod regtest {
pub static MONERO_FINALITY_CONFIRMATIONS: u32 = 1;
pub static MONERO_AVG_BLOCK_TIME: Lazy<Duration> = Lazy::new(|| Duration::from_secs(60));
pub static BITCOIN_CANCEL_TIMELOCK: Timelock = Timelock::new(50);
pub static BITCOIN_PUNISH_TIMELOCK: Timelock = Timelock::new(50);

8
swap/src/protocol/alice/steps.rs
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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ use futures::{
use libp2p::request_response::ResponseChannel;
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
use sha2::Sha256;
use std::{sync::Arc, time::Duration};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::time::timeout;
use tracing::{info, trace};
@ -147,11 +147,11 @@ where
pub async fn wait_for_bitcoin_encrypted_signature(
event_loop_handle: &mut EventLoopHandle,
timeout_duration: Duration,
) -> Result<EncryptedSignature> {
let msg3 = timeout(timeout_duration, event_loop_handle.recv_message3())
let msg3 = event_loop_handle
.recv_message3()
.await
.context("Failed to receive Bitcoin encrypted signature from Bob")??;
.context("Failed to receive Bitcoin encrypted signature from Bob")?;
Ok(msg3.tx_redeem_encsig)
}

6
swap/src/protocol/alice/swap.rs
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@ -214,10 +214,8 @@ pub async fn run_until(
// expressed more cleanly
let state = match state3.expired_timelocks(bitcoin_wallet.as_ref()).await? {
ExpiredTimelocks::None => {
let wait_for_enc_sig = wait_for_bitcoin_encrypted_signature(
&mut event_loop_handle,
config.monero_max_finality_time,
);
let wait_for_enc_sig =
wait_for_bitcoin_encrypted_signature(&mut event_loop_handle);
let state3_clone = state3.clone();
let cancel_timelock_expires = state3_clone
.wait_for_cancel_timelock_to_expire(bitcoin_wallet.as_ref());