smallstep-certificates/authority/provisioner/jwk.go
Mariano Cano c7c7decd5e
Add support for the disableSmallstepExtensions claim
This commit adds a new claim to exclude the Smallstep provisioner
extension from the generated certificates.

Fixes #620
2023-07-27 15:05:01 -07:00

294 lines
9.7 KiB
Go

package provisioner
import (
"context"
"crypto/x509"
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
"go.step.sm/crypto/jose"
"go.step.sm/crypto/sshutil"
"go.step.sm/crypto/x509util"
"go.step.sm/linkedca"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/errs"
)
// jwtPayload extends jwt.Claims with step attributes.
type jwtPayload struct {
jose.Claims
SANs []string `json:"sans,omitempty"`
Step *stepPayload `json:"step,omitempty"`
}
type stepPayload struct {
SSH *SignSSHOptions `json:"ssh,omitempty"`
RA *RAInfo `json:"ra,omitempty"`
}
// JWK is the default provisioner, an entity that can sign tokens necessary for
// signature requests.
type JWK struct {
*base
ID string `json:"-"`
Type string `json:"type"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Key *jose.JSONWebKey `json:"key"`
EncryptedKey string `json:"encryptedKey,omitempty"`
Claims *Claims `json:"claims,omitempty"`
Options *Options `json:"options,omitempty"`
ctl *Controller
}
// GetID returns the provisioner unique identifier. The name and credential id
// should uniquely identify any JWK provisioner.
func (p *JWK) GetID() string {
if p.ID != "" {
return p.ID
}
return p.GetIDForToken()
}
// GetIDForToken returns an identifier that will be used to load the provisioner
// from a token.
func (p *JWK) GetIDForToken() string {
return p.Name + ":" + p.Key.KeyID
}
// GetTokenID returns the identifier of the token.
func (p *JWK) GetTokenID(ott string) (string, error) {
// Validate payload
token, err := jose.ParseSigned(ott)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error parsing token")
}
// Get claims w/out verification. We need to look up the provisioner
// key in order to verify the claims and we need the issuer from the claims
// before we can look up the provisioner.
var claims jose.Claims
if err = token.UnsafeClaimsWithoutVerification(&claims); err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "error verifying claims")
}
return claims.ID, nil
}
// GetName returns the name of the provisioner.
func (p *JWK) GetName() string {
return p.Name
}
// GetType returns the type of provisioner.
func (p *JWK) GetType() Type {
return TypeJWK
}
// GetEncryptedKey returns the base provisioner encrypted key if it's defined.
func (p *JWK) GetEncryptedKey() (string, string, bool) {
return p.Key.KeyID, p.EncryptedKey, len(p.EncryptedKey) > 0
}
// Init initializes and validates the fields of a JWK type.
func (p *JWK) Init(config Config) (err error) {
switch {
case p.Type == "":
return errors.New("provisioner type cannot be empty")
case p.Name == "":
return errors.New("provisioner name cannot be empty")
case p.Key == nil:
return errors.New("provisioner key cannot be empty")
}
p.ctl, err = NewController(p, p.Claims, config, p.Options)
return
}
// authorizeToken performs common jwt authorization actions and returns the
// claims for case specific downstream parsing.
// e.g. a Sign request will auth/validate different fields than a Revoke request.
func (p *JWK) authorizeToken(token string, audiences []string) (*jwtPayload, error) {
jwt, err := jose.ParseSigned(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "jwk.authorizeToken; error parsing jwk token")
}
var claims jwtPayload
if err = jwt.Claims(p.Key, &claims); err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "jwk.authorizeToken; error parsing jwk claims")
}
// According to "rfc7519 JSON Web Token" acceptable skew should be no
// more than a few minutes.
if err = claims.ValidateWithLeeway(jose.Expected{
Issuer: p.Name,
Time: time.Now().UTC(),
}, time.Minute); err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrapf(http.StatusUnauthorized, err, "jwk.authorizeToken; invalid jwk claims")
}
// validate audiences with the defaults
if !matchesAudience(claims.Audience, audiences) {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("jwk.authorizeToken; invalid jwk token audience claim (aud); want %s, but got %s",
audiences, claims.Audience)
}
if claims.Subject == "" {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("jwk.authorizeToken; jwk token subject cannot be empty")
}
return &claims, nil
}
// AuthorizeRevoke returns an error if the provisioner does not have rights to
// revoke the certificate with serial number in the `sub` property.
func (p *JWK) AuthorizeRevoke(_ context.Context, token string) error {
_, err := p.authorizeToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.Revoke)
// TODO(hs): authorize the SANs using x509 name policy allow/deny rules (also for other provisioners with AuthorizeRevoke)
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "jwk.AuthorizeRevoke")
}
// AuthorizeSign validates the given token.
func (p *JWK) AuthorizeSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
claims, err := p.authorizeToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.Sign)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "jwk.AuthorizeSign")
}
// NOTE: This is for backwards compatibility with older versions of cli
// and certificates. Older versions added the token subject as the only SAN
// in a CSR by default.
if len(claims.SANs) == 0 {
claims.SANs = []string{claims.Subject}
}
// Certificate templates
data := x509util.CreateTemplateData(claims.Subject, claims.SANs)
if v, err := unsafeParseSigned(token); err == nil {
data.SetToken(v)
}
templateOptions, err := TemplateOptions(p.Options, data)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "jwk.AuthorizeSign")
}
// Wrap provisioner if the token is an RA token.
var self Interface = p
if claims.Step != nil && claims.Step.RA != nil {
self = &raProvisioner{
Interface: p,
raInfo: claims.Step.RA,
}
}
return []SignOption{
self,
templateOptions,
// modifiers / withOptions
newProvisionerExtensionOption(TypeJWK, p.Name, p.Key.KeyID).WithControllerOptions(p.ctl),
profileDefaultDuration(p.ctl.Claimer.DefaultTLSCertDuration()),
// validators
commonNameValidator(claims.Subject),
defaultPublicKeyValidator{},
defaultSANsValidator(claims.SANs),
newValidityValidator(p.ctl.Claimer.MinTLSCertDuration(), p.ctl.Claimer.MaxTLSCertDuration()),
newX509NamePolicyValidator(p.ctl.getPolicy().getX509()),
p.ctl.newWebhookController(data, linkedca.Webhook_X509),
}, nil
}
// AuthorizeRenew returns an error if the renewal is disabled.
// NOTE: This method does not actually validate the certificate or check it's
// revocation status. Just confirms that the provisioner that created the
// certificate was configured to allow renewals.
func (p *JWK) AuthorizeRenew(ctx context.Context, cert *x509.Certificate) error {
// TODO(hs): authorize the SANs using x509 name policy allow/deny rules (also for other provisioners with AuthorizeRewew and AuthorizeSSHRenew)
return p.ctl.AuthorizeRenew(ctx, cert)
}
// AuthorizeSSHSign returns the list of SignOption for a SignSSH request.
func (p *JWK) AuthorizeSSHSign(_ context.Context, token string) ([]SignOption, error) {
if !p.ctl.Claimer.IsSSHCAEnabled() {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("jwk.AuthorizeSSHSign; sshCA is disabled for jwk provisioner '%s'", p.GetName())
}
claims, err := p.authorizeToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.SSHSign)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "jwk.AuthorizeSSHSign")
}
if claims.Step == nil || claims.Step.SSH == nil {
return nil, errs.Unauthorized("jwk.AuthorizeSSHSign; jwk token must be an SSH provisioning token")
}
opts := claims.Step.SSH
signOptions := []SignOption{
// validates user's SignSSHOptions with the ones in the token
sshCertOptionsValidator(*opts),
// validate users's KeyID is the token subject.
sshCertOptionsValidator(SignSSHOptions{KeyID: claims.Subject}),
}
// Default template attributes.
certType := sshutil.UserCert
keyID := claims.Subject
principals := []string{claims.Subject}
// Use options in the token.
if opts.CertType != "" {
if certType, err = sshutil.CertTypeFromString(opts.CertType); err != nil {
return nil, errs.BadRequestErr(err, err.Error())
}
}
if opts.KeyID != "" {
keyID = opts.KeyID
}
if len(opts.Principals) > 0 {
principals = opts.Principals
}
// Certificate templates.
data := sshutil.CreateTemplateData(certType, keyID, principals)
if v, err := unsafeParseSigned(token); err == nil {
data.SetToken(v)
}
templateOptions, err := TemplateSSHOptions(p.Options, data)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "jwk.AuthorizeSign")
}
signOptions = append(signOptions, templateOptions)
// Add modifiers from custom claims
t := now()
if !opts.ValidAfter.IsZero() {
signOptions = append(signOptions, sshCertValidAfterModifier(opts.ValidAfter.RelativeTime(t).Unix()))
}
if !opts.ValidBefore.IsZero() {
signOptions = append(signOptions, sshCertValidBeforeModifier(opts.ValidBefore.RelativeTime(t).Unix()))
}
return append(signOptions,
p,
// Set the validity bounds if not set.
&sshDefaultDuration{p.ctl.Claimer},
// Validate public key
&sshDefaultPublicKeyValidator{},
// Validate the validity period.
&sshCertValidityValidator{p.ctl.Claimer},
// Require and validate all the default fields in the SSH certificate.
&sshCertDefaultValidator{},
// Ensure that all principal names are allowed
newSSHNamePolicyValidator(p.ctl.getPolicy().getSSHHost(), p.ctl.getPolicy().getSSHUser()),
// Call webhooks
p.ctl.newWebhookController(data, linkedca.Webhook_SSH),
), nil
}
// AuthorizeSSHRevoke returns nil if the token is valid, false otherwise.
func (p *JWK) AuthorizeSSHRevoke(_ context.Context, token string) error {
_, err := p.authorizeToken(token, p.ctl.Audiences.SSHRevoke)
// TODO(hs): authorize the principals using SSH name policy allow/deny rules (also for other provisioners with AuthorizeSSHRevoke)
return errs.Wrap(http.StatusInternalServerError, err, "jwk.AuthorizeSSHRevoke")
}