mirror of
https://github.com/smallstep/certificates.git
synced 2024-11-05 21:20:34 +00:00
6ba20209c2
This commit makes sure that the attestation certificate key matches the key used on the CSR on an ACME device attestation flow.
461 lines
15 KiB
Go
461 lines
15 KiB
Go
package acme
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/json"
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"net"
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"sort"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner"
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"go.step.sm/crypto/keyutil"
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"go.step.sm/crypto/x509util"
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)
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type IdentifierType string
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const (
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// IP is the ACME ip identifier type
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IP IdentifierType = "ip"
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// DNS is the ACME dns identifier type
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DNS IdentifierType = "dns"
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// PermanentIdentifier is the ACME permanent-identifier identifier type
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// defined in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bweeks-acme-device-attest-00
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PermanentIdentifier IdentifierType = "permanent-identifier"
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)
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// Identifier encodes the type that an order pertains to.
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type Identifier struct {
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Type IdentifierType `json:"type"`
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Value string `json:"value"`
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}
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// Order contains order metadata for the ACME protocol order type.
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type Order struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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AccountID string `json:"-"`
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ProvisionerID string `json:"-"`
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Status Status `json:"status"`
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ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expires"`
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Identifiers []Identifier `json:"identifiers"`
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NotBefore time.Time `json:"notBefore"`
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NotAfter time.Time `json:"notAfter"`
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Error *Error `json:"error,omitempty"`
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AuthorizationIDs []string `json:"-"`
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AuthorizationURLs []string `json:"authorizations"`
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FinalizeURL string `json:"finalize"`
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CertificateID string `json:"-"`
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CertificateURL string `json:"certificate,omitempty"`
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}
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// ToLog enables response logging.
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func (o *Order) ToLog() (interface{}, error) {
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b, err := json.Marshal(o)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, WrapErrorISE(err, "error marshaling order for logging")
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}
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return string(b), nil
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}
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// UpdateStatus updates the ACME Order Status if necessary.
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// Changes to the order are saved using the database interface.
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func (o *Order) UpdateStatus(ctx context.Context, db DB) error {
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now := clock.Now()
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switch o.Status {
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case StatusInvalid:
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return nil
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case StatusValid:
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return nil
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case StatusReady:
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// Check expiry
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if now.After(o.ExpiresAt) {
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o.Status = StatusInvalid
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o.Error = NewError(ErrorMalformedType, "order has expired")
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break
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}
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return nil
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case StatusPending:
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// Check expiry
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if now.After(o.ExpiresAt) {
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o.Status = StatusInvalid
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o.Error = NewError(ErrorMalformedType, "order has expired")
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break
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}
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var count = map[Status]int{
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StatusValid: 0,
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StatusInvalid: 0,
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StatusPending: 0,
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}
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for _, azID := range o.AuthorizationIDs {
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az, err := db.GetAuthorization(ctx, azID)
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if err != nil {
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return WrapErrorISE(err, "error getting authorization ID %s", azID)
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}
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if err = az.UpdateStatus(ctx, db); err != nil {
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return WrapErrorISE(err, "error updating authorization ID %s", azID)
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}
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st := az.Status
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count[st]++
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}
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switch {
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case count[StatusInvalid] > 0:
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o.Status = StatusInvalid
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// No change in the order status, so just return the order as is -
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// without writing any changes.
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case count[StatusPending] > 0:
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return nil
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case count[StatusValid] == len(o.AuthorizationIDs):
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o.Status = StatusReady
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default:
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return NewErrorISE("unexpected authz status")
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}
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default:
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return NewErrorISE("unrecognized order status: %s", o.Status)
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}
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if err := db.UpdateOrder(ctx, o); err != nil {
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return WrapErrorISE(err, "error updating order")
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}
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return nil
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}
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// getKeyFingerprint returns a fingerprint from the list of authorizations. This
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// fingerprint is used on the device-attest-01 flow to verify the attestation
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// certificate public key with the CSR public key.
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//
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// There's no point on reading all the authorizations as there will be only one
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// for a permanent identifier.
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func (o *Order) getAuthorizationFingerprint(ctx context.Context, db DB) (string, error) {
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for _, azID := range o.AuthorizationIDs {
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az, err := db.GetAuthorization(ctx, azID)
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if err != nil {
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return "", WrapErrorISE(err, "error getting authorization %q", azID)
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}
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// There's no point on reading all the authorizations as there will
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// be only one for a permanent identifier.
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if az.Fingerprint != "" {
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return az.Fingerprint, nil
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}
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}
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return "", nil
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}
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// Finalize signs a certificate if the necessary conditions for Order completion
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// have been met.
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//
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// TODO(mariano): Here or in the challenge validation we should perform some
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// external validation using the identifier value and the attestation data. From
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// a validation service we can get the list of SANs to set in the final
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// certificate.
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func (o *Order) Finalize(ctx context.Context, db DB, csr *x509.CertificateRequest, auth CertificateAuthority, p Provisioner) error {
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if err := o.UpdateStatus(ctx, db); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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switch o.Status {
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case StatusInvalid:
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return NewError(ErrorOrderNotReadyType, "order %s has been abandoned", o.ID)
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case StatusValid:
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return nil
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case StatusPending:
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return NewError(ErrorOrderNotReadyType, "order %s is not ready", o.ID)
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case StatusReady:
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break
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default:
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return NewErrorISE("unexpected status %s for order %s", o.Status, o.ID)
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}
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// Get key fingerprint if any. And then compare it with the CSR fingerprint.
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//
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// In device-attest-01 challenges we should check that the keys in the CSR
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// and the attestation certificate are the same.
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fingerprint, err := o.getAuthorizationFingerprint(ctx, db)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if fingerprint != "" {
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fp, err := keyutil.Fingerprint(csr.PublicKey)
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if err != nil {
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return WrapErrorISE(err, "error calculating key fingerprint")
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}
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(fingerprint), []byte(fp)) == 0 {
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return NewError(ErrorUnauthorizedType, "order %s csr does not match the attested key", o.ID)
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}
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}
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// canonicalize the CSR to allow for comparison
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csr = canonicalize(csr)
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// Template data
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data := x509util.NewTemplateData()
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data.SetCommonName(csr.Subject.CommonName)
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// Custom sign options passed to authority.Sign
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var extraOptions []provisioner.SignOption
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// TODO: support for multiple identifiers?
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var permanentIdentifier string
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for i := range o.Identifiers {
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if o.Identifiers[i].Type == PermanentIdentifier {
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permanentIdentifier = o.Identifiers[i].Value
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// the first (and only) Permanent Identifier that gets added to the certificate
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// should be equal to the Subject Common Name if it's set. If not equal, the CSR
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// is rejected, because the Common Name hasn't been challenged in that case. This
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// could result in unauthorized access if a relying system relies on the Common
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// Name in its authorization logic.
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if csr.Subject.CommonName != "" && csr.Subject.CommonName != permanentIdentifier {
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return NewError(ErrorBadCSRType, "CSR Subject Common Name does not match identifiers exactly: "+
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"CSR Subject Common Name = %s, Order Permanent Identifier = %s", csr.Subject.CommonName, permanentIdentifier)
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}
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break
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}
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}
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var defaultTemplate string
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if permanentIdentifier != "" {
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defaultTemplate = x509util.DefaultAttestedLeafTemplate
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data.SetSubjectAlternativeNames(x509util.SubjectAlternativeName{
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Type: x509util.PermanentIdentifierType,
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Value: permanentIdentifier,
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})
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extraOptions = append(extraOptions, provisioner.AttestationData{
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PermanentIdentifier: permanentIdentifier,
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})
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} else {
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defaultTemplate = x509util.DefaultLeafTemplate
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sans, err := o.sans(csr)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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data.SetSubjectAlternativeNames(sans...)
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}
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// Get authorizations from the ACME provisioner.
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ctx = provisioner.NewContextWithMethod(ctx, provisioner.SignMethod)
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signOps, err := p.AuthorizeSign(ctx, "")
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if err != nil {
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return WrapErrorISE(err, "error retrieving authorization options from ACME provisioner")
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}
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// Unlike most of the provisioners, ACME's AuthorizeSign method doesn't
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// define the templates, and the template data used in WebHooks is not
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// available.
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for _, signOp := range signOps {
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if wc, ok := signOp.(*provisioner.WebhookController); ok {
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wc.TemplateData = data
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}
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}
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templateOptions, err := provisioner.CustomTemplateOptions(p.GetOptions(), data, defaultTemplate)
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if err != nil {
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return WrapErrorISE(err, "error creating template options from ACME provisioner")
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}
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// Build extra signing options.
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signOps = append(signOps, templateOptions)
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signOps = append(signOps, extraOptions...)
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// Sign a new certificate.
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certChain, err := auth.Sign(csr, provisioner.SignOptions{
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NotBefore: provisioner.NewTimeDuration(o.NotBefore),
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NotAfter: provisioner.NewTimeDuration(o.NotAfter),
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}, signOps...)
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if err != nil {
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return WrapErrorISE(err, "error signing certificate for order %s", o.ID)
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}
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cert := &Certificate{
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AccountID: o.AccountID,
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OrderID: o.ID,
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Leaf: certChain[0],
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Intermediates: certChain[1:],
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}
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if err := db.CreateCertificate(ctx, cert); err != nil {
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return WrapErrorISE(err, "error creating certificate for order %s", o.ID)
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}
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o.CertificateID = cert.ID
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o.Status = StatusValid
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if err = db.UpdateOrder(ctx, o); err != nil {
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return WrapErrorISE(err, "error updating order %s", o.ID)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (o *Order) sans(csr *x509.CertificateRequest) ([]x509util.SubjectAlternativeName, error) {
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var sans []x509util.SubjectAlternativeName
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if len(csr.EmailAddresses) > 0 || len(csr.URIs) > 0 {
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return sans, NewError(ErrorBadCSRType, "Only DNS names and IP addresses are allowed")
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}
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// order the DNS names and IP addresses, so that they can be compared against the canonicalized CSR
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orderNames := make([]string, numberOfIdentifierType(DNS, o.Identifiers))
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orderIPs := make([]net.IP, numberOfIdentifierType(IP, o.Identifiers))
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orderPIDs := make([]string, numberOfIdentifierType(PermanentIdentifier, o.Identifiers))
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indexDNS, indexIP, indexPID := 0, 0, 0
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for _, n := range o.Identifiers {
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switch n.Type {
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case DNS:
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orderNames[indexDNS] = n.Value
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indexDNS++
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case IP:
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orderIPs[indexIP] = net.ParseIP(n.Value) // NOTE: this assumes are all valid IPs at this time; or will result in nil entries
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indexIP++
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case PermanentIdentifier:
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orderPIDs[indexPID] = n.Value
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indexPID++
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default:
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return sans, NewErrorISE("unsupported identifier type in order: %s", n.Type)
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}
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}
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orderNames = uniqueSortedLowerNames(orderNames)
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orderIPs = uniqueSortedIPs(orderIPs)
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totalNumberOfSANs := len(csr.DNSNames) + len(csr.IPAddresses)
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sans = make([]x509util.SubjectAlternativeName, totalNumberOfSANs)
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index := 0
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// Validate identifier names against CSR alternative names.
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//
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// Note that with certificate templates we are not going to check for the
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// absence of other SANs as they will only be set if the template allows
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// them.
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if len(csr.DNSNames) != len(orderNames) {
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return sans, NewError(ErrorBadCSRType, "CSR names do not match identifiers exactly: "+
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"CSR names = %v, Order names = %v", csr.DNSNames, orderNames)
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}
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for i := range csr.DNSNames {
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if csr.DNSNames[i] != orderNames[i] {
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return sans, NewError(ErrorBadCSRType, "CSR names do not match identifiers exactly: "+
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"CSR names = %v, Order names = %v", csr.DNSNames, orderNames)
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}
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sans[index] = x509util.SubjectAlternativeName{
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Type: x509util.DNSType,
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Value: csr.DNSNames[i],
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}
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index++
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}
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if len(csr.IPAddresses) != len(orderIPs) {
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return sans, NewError(ErrorBadCSRType, "CSR IPs do not match identifiers exactly: "+
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"CSR IPs = %v, Order IPs = %v", csr.IPAddresses, orderIPs)
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}
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for i := range csr.IPAddresses {
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if !ipsAreEqual(csr.IPAddresses[i], orderIPs[i]) {
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return sans, NewError(ErrorBadCSRType, "CSR IPs do not match identifiers exactly: "+
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"CSR IPs = %v, Order IPs = %v", csr.IPAddresses, orderIPs)
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}
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sans[index] = x509util.SubjectAlternativeName{
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Type: x509util.IPType,
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Value: csr.IPAddresses[i].String(),
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}
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index++
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}
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return sans, nil
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}
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// numberOfIdentifierType returns the number of Identifiers that
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// are of type typ.
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func numberOfIdentifierType(typ IdentifierType, ids []Identifier) int {
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c := 0
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for _, id := range ids {
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if id.Type == typ {
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c++
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}
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}
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return c
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}
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// canonicalize canonicalizes a CSR so that it can be compared against an Order
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// NOTE: this effectively changes the order of SANs in the CSR, which may be OK,
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// but may not be expected. It also adds a Subject Common Name to either the IP
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// addresses or DNS names slice, depending on whether it can be parsed as an IP
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// or not. This might result in an additional SAN in the final certificate.
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func canonicalize(csr *x509.CertificateRequest) (canonicalized *x509.CertificateRequest) {
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// for clarity only; we're operating on the same object by pointer
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canonicalized = csr
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// RFC8555: The CSR MUST indicate the exact same set of requested
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// identifiers as the initial newOrder request. Identifiers of type "dns"
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// MUST appear either in the commonName portion of the requested subject
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// name or in an extensionRequest attribute [RFC2985] requesting a
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// subjectAltName extension, or both. Subject Common Names that can be
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// parsed as an IP are included as an IP address for the equality check.
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// If these were excluded, a certificate could contain an IP as the
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// common name without having been challenged.
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if csr.Subject.CommonName != "" {
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if ip := net.ParseIP(csr.Subject.CommonName); ip != nil {
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canonicalized.IPAddresses = append(canonicalized.IPAddresses, ip)
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} else {
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canonicalized.DNSNames = append(canonicalized.DNSNames, csr.Subject.CommonName)
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}
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}
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canonicalized.DNSNames = uniqueSortedLowerNames(canonicalized.DNSNames)
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canonicalized.IPAddresses = uniqueSortedIPs(canonicalized.IPAddresses)
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return canonicalized
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}
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// ipsAreEqual compares IPs to be equal. Nil values (i.e. invalid IPs) are
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// not considered equal. IPv6 representations of IPv4 addresses are
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// considered equal to the IPv4 address in this implementation, which is
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// standard Go behavior. An example is "::ffff:192.168.42.42", which
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// is equal to "192.168.42.42". This is considered a known issue within
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// step and is tracked here too: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/37921.
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func ipsAreEqual(x, y net.IP) bool {
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if x == nil || y == nil {
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return false
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}
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return x.Equal(y)
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}
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// uniqueSortedLowerNames returns the set of all unique names in the input after all
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// of them are lowercased. The returned names will be in their lowercased form
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// and sorted alphabetically.
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func uniqueSortedLowerNames(names []string) (unique []string) {
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nameMap := make(map[string]int, len(names))
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for _, name := range names {
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nameMap[strings.ToLower(name)] = 1
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}
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unique = make([]string, 0, len(nameMap))
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for name := range nameMap {
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unique = append(unique, name)
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}
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sort.Strings(unique)
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return
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}
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// uniqueSortedIPs returns the set of all unique net.IPs in the input. They
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// are sorted by their bytes (octet) representation.
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func uniqueSortedIPs(ips []net.IP) (unique []net.IP) {
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type entry struct {
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ip net.IP
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}
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ipEntryMap := make(map[string]entry, len(ips))
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for _, ip := range ips {
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// reparsing the IP results in the IP being represented using 16 bytes
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// for both IPv4 as well as IPv6, even when the ips slice contains IPs that
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// are represented by 4 bytes. This ensures a fair comparison and thus ordering.
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ipEntryMap[ip.String()] = entry{ip: net.ParseIP(ip.String())}
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}
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unique = make([]net.IP, 0, len(ipEntryMap))
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for _, entry := range ipEntryMap {
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unique = append(unique, entry.ip)
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}
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sort.Slice(unique, func(i, j int) bool {
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return bytes.Compare(unique[i], unique[j]) < 0
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})
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return
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}
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