smallstep-certificates/scep/authority.go

566 lines
18 KiB
Go

package scep
import (
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"sync"
microx509util "github.com/micromdm/scep/v2/cryptoutil/x509util"
microscep "github.com/micromdm/scep/v2/scep"
"go.mozilla.org/pkcs7"
"go.step.sm/crypto/x509util"
"github.com/smallstep/certificates/authority/provisioner"
)
// Authority is the layer that handles all SCEP interactions.
type Authority struct {
signAuth SignAuthority
roots []*x509.Certificate
intermediates []*x509.Certificate
defaultSigner crypto.Signer
signerCertificate *x509.Certificate
defaultDecrypter crypto.Decrypter
decrypterCertificate *x509.Certificate
scepProvisionerNames []string
provisionersMutex sync.RWMutex
encryptionAlgorithmMutex sync.Mutex
}
type authorityKey struct{}
// NewContext adds the given authority to the context.
func NewContext(ctx context.Context, a *Authority) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, authorityKey{}, a)
}
// FromContext returns the current authority from the given context.
func FromContext(ctx context.Context) (a *Authority, ok bool) {
a, ok = ctx.Value(authorityKey{}).(*Authority)
return
}
// MustFromContext returns the current authority from the given context. It will
// panic if the authority is not in the context.
func MustFromContext(ctx context.Context) *Authority {
if a, ok := FromContext(ctx); !ok {
panic("scep authority is not in the context")
} else {
return a
}
}
// SignAuthority is the interface for a signing authority
type SignAuthority interface {
Sign(cr *x509.CertificateRequest, opts provisioner.SignOptions, signOpts ...provisioner.SignOption) ([]*x509.Certificate, error)
LoadProvisionerByName(string) (provisioner.Interface, error)
}
// New returns a new Authority that implements the SCEP interface.
func New(signAuth SignAuthority, opts Options) (*Authority, error) {
if err := opts.Validate(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &Authority{
signAuth: signAuth, // TODO: provide signAuth through context instead?
roots: opts.Roots,
intermediates: opts.Intermediates,
defaultSigner: opts.Signer,
signerCertificate: opts.SignerCert,
defaultDecrypter: opts.Decrypter,
decrypterCertificate: opts.SignerCert, // the intermediate signer cert is also the decrypter cert (if RSA)
scepProvisionerNames: opts.SCEPProvisionerNames,
}, nil
}
// Validate validates if the SCEP Authority has a valid configuration.
// The validation includes a check if a decrypter is available, either
// an authority wide decrypter, or a provisioner specific decrypter.
func (a *Authority) Validate() error {
if a == nil {
return nil
}
a.provisionersMutex.RLock()
defer a.provisionersMutex.RUnlock()
noDefaultDecrypterAvailable := a.defaultDecrypter == nil
for _, name := range a.scepProvisionerNames {
p, err := a.LoadProvisionerByName(name)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed loading provisioner %q: %w", name, err)
}
if scepProv, ok := p.(*provisioner.SCEP); ok {
cert, decrypter := scepProv.GetDecrypter()
// TODO(hs): return sentinel/typed error, to be able to ignore/log these cases during init?
if cert == nil && noDefaultDecrypterAvailable {
return fmt.Errorf("SCEP provisioner %q does not have a decrypter certificate", name)
}
if decrypter == nil && noDefaultDecrypterAvailable {
return fmt.Errorf("SCEP provisioner %q does not have decrypter", name)
}
}
}
return nil
}
// UpdateProvisioners updates the SCEP Authority with the new, and hopefully
// current SCEP provisioners configured. This allows the Authority to be
// validated with the latest data.
func (a *Authority) UpdateProvisioners(scepProvisionerNames []string) {
if a == nil {
return
}
a.provisionersMutex.Lock()
defer a.provisionersMutex.Unlock()
a.scepProvisionerNames = scepProvisionerNames
}
var (
// TODO: check the default capabilities; https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8894#section-3.5.2
defaultCapabilities = []string{
"Renewal", // NOTE: removing this will result in macOS SCEP client stating the server doesn't support renewal, but it uses PKCSreq to do so.
"SHA-1",
"SHA-256",
"AES",
"DES3",
"SCEPStandard",
"POSTPKIOperation",
}
)
// LoadProvisionerByName calls out to the SignAuthority interface to load a
// provisioner by name.
func (a *Authority) LoadProvisionerByName(name string) (provisioner.Interface, error) {
return a.signAuth.LoadProvisionerByName(name)
}
// GetCACertificates returns the certificate (chain) for the CA.
//
// This methods returns the "SCEP Server (RA)" certificate, the issuing CA up to and excl. the root.
// Some clients do need the root certificate however; also see: https://github.com/openxpki/openxpki/issues/73
//
// In case a provisioner specific decrypter is available, this is used as the "SCEP Server (RA)" certificate
// instead of the CA intermediate directly. This uses a distinct instance of a KMS for doing the SCEP key
// operations, so that RSA can be used for just SCEP.
//
// Using an RA does not seem to exist in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8894, but is mentioned in
// https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-nourse-scep-21.html.
func (a *Authority) GetCACertificates(ctx context.Context) (certs []*x509.Certificate, err error) {
p := provisionerFromContext(ctx)
// if a provisioner specific RSA decrypter is available, it is returned as
// the first certificate.
if decrypterCertificate, _ := p.GetDecrypter(); decrypterCertificate != nil {
certs = append(certs, decrypterCertificate)
}
// the CA intermediate is added to the chain by default. It's possible to
// exclude it from being added through configuration. This can be useful in
// environments where the SCEP client doesn't select the right RSA decrypter
// certificate, resulting in the wrong recipient in the PKCS7 message.
if p.ShouldIncludeIntermediateInChain() || len(certs) == 0 {
// TODO(hs): ensure logic is in place that checks the signer is the first
// intermediate and that there are no double certificates.
certs = append(certs, a.intermediates...)
}
// the CA roots are added for completeness when configured to do so. Clients
// are responsible to select the right cert(s) to store and use.
if p.ShouldIncludeRootInChain() {
certs = append(certs, a.roots...)
}
return certs, nil
}
// DecryptPKIEnvelope decrypts an enveloped message
func (a *Authority) DecryptPKIEnvelope(ctx context.Context, msg *PKIMessage) error {
p7c, err := pkcs7.Parse(msg.P7.Content)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error parsing pkcs7 content: %w", err)
}
cert, decrypter, err := a.selectDecrypter(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed selecting decrypter: %w", err)
}
envelope, err := p7c.Decrypt(cert, decrypter)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error decrypting encrypted pkcs7 content: %w", err)
}
msg.pkiEnvelope = envelope
switch msg.MessageType {
case microscep.CertRep:
certs, err := microscep.CACerts(msg.pkiEnvelope)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error extracting CA certs from pkcs7 degenerate data: %w", err)
}
msg.CertRepMessage.Certificate = certs[0]
return nil
case microscep.PKCSReq, microscep.UpdateReq, microscep.RenewalReq:
csr, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(msg.pkiEnvelope)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("parse CSR from pkiEnvelope: %w", err)
}
if err := csr.CheckSignature(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid CSR signature; %w", err)
}
// extract the challenge password
cp, err := microx509util.ParseChallengePassword(msg.pkiEnvelope)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("parse challenge password in pkiEnvelope: %w", err)
}
msg.CSRReqMessage = &microscep.CSRReqMessage{
RawDecrypted: msg.pkiEnvelope,
CSR: csr,
ChallengePassword: cp,
}
return nil
case microscep.GetCRL, microscep.GetCert, microscep.CertPoll:
return errors.New("not implemented")
}
return nil
}
// SignCSR creates an x509.Certificate based on a CSR template and Cert Authority credentials
// returns a new PKIMessage with CertRep data
func (a *Authority) SignCSR(ctx context.Context, csr *x509.CertificateRequest, msg *PKIMessage) (*PKIMessage, error) {
// TODO: intermediate storage of the request? In SCEP it's possible to request a csr/certificate
// to be signed, which can be performed asynchronously / out-of-band. In that case a client can
// poll for the status. It seems to be similar as what can happen in ACME, so might want to model
// the implementation after the one in the ACME authority. Requires storage, etc.
p := provisionerFromContext(ctx)
// check if CSRReqMessage has already been decrypted
if msg.CSRReqMessage.CSR == nil {
if err := a.DecryptPKIEnvelope(ctx, msg); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
csr = msg.CSRReqMessage.CSR
}
// Template data
sans := []string{}
sans = append(sans, csr.DNSNames...)
sans = append(sans, csr.EmailAddresses...)
for _, v := range csr.IPAddresses {
sans = append(sans, v.String())
}
for _, v := range csr.URIs {
sans = append(sans, v.String())
}
if len(sans) == 0 {
sans = append(sans, csr.Subject.CommonName)
}
data := x509util.CreateTemplateData(csr.Subject.CommonName, sans)
data.SetCertificateRequest(csr)
data.SetSubject(x509util.Subject{
Country: csr.Subject.Country,
Organization: csr.Subject.Organization,
OrganizationalUnit: csr.Subject.OrganizationalUnit,
Locality: csr.Subject.Locality,
Province: csr.Subject.Province,
StreetAddress: csr.Subject.StreetAddress,
PostalCode: csr.Subject.PostalCode,
SerialNumber: csr.Subject.SerialNumber,
CommonName: csr.Subject.CommonName,
})
// Get authorizations from the SCEP provisioner.
ctx = provisioner.NewContextWithMethod(ctx, provisioner.SignMethod)
signOps, err := p.AuthorizeSign(ctx, "")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error retrieving authorization options from SCEP provisioner: %w", err)
}
// Unlike most of the provisioners, scep's AuthorizeSign method doesn't
// define the templates, and the template data used in WebHooks is not
// available.
for _, signOp := range signOps {
if wc, ok := signOp.(*provisioner.WebhookController); ok {
wc.TemplateData = data
}
}
opts := provisioner.SignOptions{}
templateOptions, err := provisioner.TemplateOptions(p.GetOptions(), data)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error creating template options from SCEP provisioner: %w", err)
}
signOps = append(signOps, templateOptions)
certChain, err := a.signAuth.Sign(csr, opts, signOps...)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error generating certificate for order: %w", err)
}
// take the issued certificate (only); https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8894#section-3.3.2
cert := certChain[0]
// and create a degenerate cert structure
deg, err := microscep.DegenerateCertificates([]*x509.Certificate{cert})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed generating degenerate certificate: %w", err)
}
e7, err := a.encrypt(deg, msg.P7.Certificates, p.GetContentEncryptionAlgorithm())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed encrypting degenerate certificate: %w", err)
}
// PKIMessageAttributes to be signed
config := pkcs7.SignerInfoConfig{
ExtraSignedAttributes: []pkcs7.Attribute{
{
Type: oidSCEPtransactionID,
Value: msg.TransactionID,
},
{
Type: oidSCEPpkiStatus,
Value: microscep.SUCCESS,
},
{
Type: oidSCEPmessageType,
Value: microscep.CertRep,
},
{
Type: oidSCEPrecipientNonce,
Value: msg.SenderNonce,
},
{
Type: oidSCEPsenderNonce,
Value: msg.SenderNonce,
},
},
}
signedData, err := pkcs7.NewSignedData(e7)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// add the certificate into the signed data type
// this cert must be added before the signedData because the recipient will expect it
// as the first certificate in the array
signedData.AddCertificate(cert)
signerCert, signer, err := a.selectSigner(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed selecting signer: %w", err)
}
// sign the attributes
if err := signedData.AddSigner(signerCert, signer, config); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
certRepBytes, err := signedData.Finish()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cr := &CertRepMessage{
PKIStatus: microscep.SUCCESS,
RecipientNonce: microscep.RecipientNonce(msg.SenderNonce),
Certificate: cert,
degenerate: deg,
}
// create a CertRep message from the original
crepMsg := &PKIMessage{
Raw: certRepBytes,
TransactionID: msg.TransactionID,
MessageType: microscep.CertRep,
CertRepMessage: cr,
}
return crepMsg, nil
}
func (a *Authority) encrypt(content []byte, recipients []*x509.Certificate, algorithm int) ([]byte, error) {
// apparently the pkcs7 library uses a global default setting for the content encryption
// algorithm to use when en- or decrypting data. We need to restore the current setting after
// the cryptographic operation, so that other usages of the library are not influenced by
// this call to Encrypt(). We are not required to use the same algorithm the SCEP client uses.
a.encryptionAlgorithmMutex.Lock()
defer a.encryptionAlgorithmMutex.Unlock()
encryptionAlgorithmToRestore := pkcs7.ContentEncryptionAlgorithm
defer func() {
pkcs7.ContentEncryptionAlgorithm = encryptionAlgorithmToRestore
}()
pkcs7.ContentEncryptionAlgorithm = algorithm
e7, err := pkcs7.Encrypt(content, recipients)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return e7, nil
}
// CreateFailureResponse creates an appropriately signed reply for PKI operations
func (a *Authority) CreateFailureResponse(ctx context.Context, _ *x509.CertificateRequest, msg *PKIMessage, info FailInfoName, infoText string) (*PKIMessage, error) {
config := pkcs7.SignerInfoConfig{
ExtraSignedAttributes: []pkcs7.Attribute{
{
Type: oidSCEPtransactionID,
Value: msg.TransactionID,
},
{
Type: oidSCEPpkiStatus,
Value: microscep.FAILURE,
},
{
Type: oidSCEPfailInfo,
Value: info,
},
{
Type: oidSCEPfailInfoText,
Value: infoText,
},
{
Type: oidSCEPmessageType,
Value: microscep.CertRep,
},
{
Type: oidSCEPsenderNonce,
Value: msg.SenderNonce,
},
{
Type: oidSCEPrecipientNonce,
Value: msg.SenderNonce,
},
},
}
signedData, err := pkcs7.NewSignedData(nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
signerCert, signer, err := a.selectSigner(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed selecting signer: %w", err)
}
// sign the attributes
if err := signedData.AddSigner(signerCert, signer, config); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
certRepBytes, err := signedData.Finish()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cr := &CertRepMessage{
PKIStatus: microscep.FAILURE,
FailInfo: microscep.FailInfo(info),
RecipientNonce: microscep.RecipientNonce(msg.SenderNonce),
}
// create a CertRep message from the original
crepMsg := &PKIMessage{
Raw: certRepBytes,
TransactionID: msg.TransactionID,
MessageType: microscep.CertRep,
CertRepMessage: cr,
}
return crepMsg, nil
}
// GetCACaps returns the CA capabilities
func (a *Authority) GetCACaps(ctx context.Context) []string {
p := provisionerFromContext(ctx)
caps := p.GetCapabilities()
if len(caps) == 0 {
return defaultCapabilities
}
// TODO: validate the caps? Ensure they are the right format according to RFC?
// TODO: ensure that the capabilities are actually "enforced"/"verified" in code too:
// check that only parts of the spec are used in the implementation belonging to the capabilities.
// For example for renewals, which we could disable in the provisioner, should then also
// not be reported in cacaps operation.
return caps
}
func (a *Authority) ValidateChallenge(ctx context.Context, csr *x509.CertificateRequest, challenge, transactionID string) error {
p := provisionerFromContext(ctx)
return p.ValidateChallenge(ctx, csr, challenge, transactionID)
}
func (a *Authority) NotifySuccess(ctx context.Context, csr *x509.CertificateRequest, cert *x509.Certificate, transactionID string) error {
p := provisionerFromContext(ctx)
return p.NotifySuccess(ctx, csr, cert, transactionID)
}
func (a *Authority) NotifyFailure(ctx context.Context, csr *x509.CertificateRequest, transactionID string, errorCode int, errorDescription string) error {
p := provisionerFromContext(ctx)
return p.NotifyFailure(ctx, csr, transactionID, errorCode, errorDescription)
}
func (a *Authority) selectDecrypter(ctx context.Context) (cert *x509.Certificate, decrypter crypto.Decrypter, err error) {
p := provisionerFromContext(ctx)
cert, decrypter = p.GetDecrypter()
switch {
case cert != nil && decrypter != nil:
return
case cert == nil && decrypter != nil:
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("provisioner %q does not have a decrypter certificate available", p.GetName())
case cert != nil && decrypter == nil:
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("provisioner %q does not have a decrypter available", p.GetName())
}
cert, decrypter = a.decrypterCertificate, a.defaultDecrypter
switch {
case cert == nil && decrypter != nil:
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("provisioner %q does not have a default decrypter certificate available", p.GetName())
case cert != nil && decrypter == nil:
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("provisioner %q does not have a default decrypter available", p.GetName())
}
return
}
func (a *Authority) selectSigner(ctx context.Context) (cert *x509.Certificate, signer crypto.Signer, err error) {
p := provisionerFromContext(ctx)
cert, signer = p.GetSigner()
switch {
case cert != nil && signer != nil:
return
case cert == nil && signer != nil:
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("provisioner %q does not have a signer certificate available", p.GetName())
case cert != nil && signer == nil:
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("provisioner %q does not have a signer available", p.GetName())
}
cert, signer = a.signerCertificate, a.defaultSigner
switch {
case cert == nil && signer != nil:
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("provisioner %q does not have a default signer certificate available", p.GetName())
case cert != nil && signer == nil:
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("provisioner %q does not have a default signer available", p.GetName())
}
return
}