An RSA key can sign another certificates using the RSA PKCS#1
and the RSA-PSS scheme, this change will keep the signature
algorithm used in the issuer in the signed certificates instead
of using PKCS#1 by default.
The next Go release call panic on elliptic.Marshal [1][2], which
affect the test case fail_ec_marshal on createPublicKey.
This changes fix this by initializing the P and B in test case
PublicKey CurveParams to prevent panic.
[1] https://github.com/golang/go/issues/50975
[2] a218b3520a
This change adds a new authority option that allows to pass a callback
that returns the certificate chain and signer used to sign X.509
certificates.
This option will be used by Caddy, they renew the intermediate
certificate weekly and there's no other way to replace it without
re-creating the embedded CA.
Fixes#874
With the update of go.step.sm/linkedca grpc.WithInsecure was
deprecated. This commit fixes this by setting up the (insecure)
connection using the new method.
* use json.RawMessage to remote mapstructure in options
* use vault secretid structure to support multiple source aka string, file and env
* remove log prefix
* return raw cert on error on newline for cert and csr
* clean sans, commonName in createCertificate (bad copy/paste from StepCAS)
* verify authority fingerprint
* convert serial on revoke to bigint, bytes and vault dashed representation
CloudKMS keys signs data using an specific signature algorithm, in RSA keys,
this can be PKCS#1 RSA or RSA-PSS, if the later is used, x509.CreateCertificate
will fail unless the template SignatureCertificate is properly set.
On contrast, AWSKMS RSA keys, are just RSA keys, and can sign with PKCS#1 or
RSA-PSS schemes, so right now the way to enforce one or the other is to used
templates.