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https://gitlab.com/yawning/obfs4.git
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8cd2e1f0f9
This makes the length error and MAC error indistinguishable to an external attacker.
310 lines
9.9 KiB
Go
310 lines
9.9 KiB
Go
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2014, Yawning Angel <yawning at torproject dot org>
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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*
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* * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
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* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
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* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
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* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
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* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
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* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
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* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
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* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
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* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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//
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// Package framing implements the obfs4 link framing and cryptography.
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//
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// The Encoder/Decoder shared secret format is:
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// uint8_t[32] NaCl secretbox key
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// uint8_t[16] NaCl Nonce prefix
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// uint8_t[16] SipHash-2-4 key (used to obfsucate length)
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//
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// The frame format is:
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// uint16_t length (obfsucated, big endian)
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// NaCl secretbox (Poly1305/XSalsa20) containing:
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// uint8_t[16] tag (Part of the secretbox construct)
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// uint8_t[] payload
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//
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// The length field is length of the NaCl secretbox XORed with the truncated
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// SipHash-2-4 digest of the nonce used to seal/unseal the current secretbox.
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//
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// The NaCl secretbox (Poly1305/XSalsa20) nonce format is:
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// uint8_t[24] prefix (Fixed)
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// uint64_t counter (Big endian)
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//
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// The counter is initialized to 1, and is incremented on each frame. Since
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// the protocol is designed to be used over a reliable medium, the nonce is not
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// transmitted over the wire as both sides of the conversation know the prefix
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// and the initial counter value. It is imperative that the counter does not
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// wrap, and sessions MUST terminate before 2^64 frames are sent.
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//
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package framing
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/binary"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"hash"
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"io"
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"code.google.com/p/go.crypto/nacl/secretbox"
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"github.com/dchest/siphash"
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"github.com/yawning/obfs4/csrand"
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)
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const (
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// MaximumSegmentLength is the length of the largest possible segment
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// including overhead.
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MaximumSegmentLength = 1500 - (40 + 12)
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// FrameOverhead is the length of the framing overhead.
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FrameOverhead = lengthLength + secretbox.Overhead
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// MaximumFramePayloadLength is the length of the maximum allowed payload
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// per frame.
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MaximumFramePayloadLength = MaximumSegmentLength - FrameOverhead
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// KeyLength is the length of the Encoder/Decoder secret key.
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KeyLength = keyLength + noncePrefixLength + 16
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maxFrameLength = MaximumSegmentLength - lengthLength
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minFrameLength = FrameOverhead - lengthLength
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keyLength = 32
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noncePrefixLength = 16
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nonceCounterLength = 8
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nonceLength = noncePrefixLength + nonceCounterLength
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lengthLength = 2
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)
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// Error returned when Decoder.Decode() requires more data to continue.
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var ErrAgain = errors.New("framing: More data needed to decode")
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// Error returned when Decoder.Decode() failes to authenticate a frame.
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var ErrTagMismatch = errors.New("framing: Poly1305 tag mismatch")
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// Error returned when the NaCl secretbox nonce's counter wraps (FATAL).
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var ErrNonceCounterWrapped = errors.New("framing: Nonce counter wrapped")
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// InvalidPayloadLengthError is the error returned when Encoder.Encode()
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// rejects the payload length.
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type InvalidPayloadLengthError int
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func (e InvalidPayloadLengthError) Error() string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("framing: Invalid payload length: %d", int(e))
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}
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type boxNonce struct {
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prefix [noncePrefixLength]byte
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counter uint64
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}
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func (nonce *boxNonce) init(prefix []byte) {
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if noncePrefixLength != len(prefix) {
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panic(fmt.Sprintf("BUG: Nonce prefix length invalid: %d", len(prefix)))
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}
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copy(nonce.prefix[:], prefix)
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nonce.counter = 1
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}
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func (nonce boxNonce) bytes(out *[nonceLength]byte) error {
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// The security guarantee of Poly1305 is broken if a nonce is ever reused
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// for a given key. Detect this by checking for counter wraparound since
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// we start each counter at 1. If it ever happens that more than 2^64 - 1
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// frames are transmitted over a given connection, support for rekeying
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// will be neccecary, but that's unlikely to happen.
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if nonce.counter == 0 {
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return ErrNonceCounterWrapped
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}
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copy(out[:], nonce.prefix[:])
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out[noncePrefixLength:], nonce.counter)
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return nil
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}
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// Encoder is a frame encoder instance.
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type Encoder struct {
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key [keyLength]byte
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sip hash.Hash64
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nonce boxNonce
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}
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// NewEncoder creates a new Encoder instance. It must be supplied a slice
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// containing exactly KeyLength bytes of keying material.
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func NewEncoder(key []byte) *Encoder {
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if len(key) != KeyLength {
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panic(fmt.Sprintf("BUG: Invalid encoder key length: %d", len(key)))
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}
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encoder := new(Encoder)
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copy(encoder.key[:], key[0:keyLength])
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encoder.nonce.init(key[keyLength : keyLength+noncePrefixLength])
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encoder.sip = siphash.New(key[keyLength+noncePrefixLength:])
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return encoder
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}
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// Encode encodes a single frame worth of payload and returns the encoded
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// length. InvalidPayloadLengthError is recoverable, all other errors MUST be
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// treated as fatal and the session aborted.
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func (encoder *Encoder) Encode(frame, payload []byte) (n int, err error) {
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payloadLen := len(payload)
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if MaximumFramePayloadLength < payloadLen {
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return 0, InvalidPayloadLengthError(payloadLen)
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}
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if len(frame) < payloadLen+FrameOverhead {
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return 0, io.ErrShortBuffer
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}
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// Generate a new nonce.
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var nonce [nonceLength]byte
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err = encoder.nonce.bytes(&nonce)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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}
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encoder.nonce.counter++
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// Encrypt and MAC payload.
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box := secretbox.Seal(frame[:lengthLength], payload, &nonce, &encoder.key)
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// Obfuscate the length.
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length := uint16(len(box) - lengthLength)
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encoder.sip.Write(nonce[:])
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lengthMask := encoder.sip.Sum(nil)
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encoder.sip.Reset()
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length ^= binary.BigEndian.Uint16(lengthMask)
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(frame[:2], length)
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// Return the frame.
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return len(box), nil
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}
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// Decoder is a frame decoder instance.
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type Decoder struct {
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key [keyLength]byte
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nonce boxNonce
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sip hash.Hash64
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nextNonce [nonceLength]byte
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nextLength uint16
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nextLengthInvalid bool
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}
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// NewDecoder creates a new Decoder instance. It must be supplied a slice
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// containing exactly KeyLength bytes of keying material.
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func NewDecoder(key []byte) *Decoder {
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if len(key) != KeyLength {
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panic(fmt.Sprintf("BUG: Invalid decoder key length: %d", len(key)))
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}
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decoder := new(Decoder)
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copy(decoder.key[:], key[0:keyLength])
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decoder.nonce.init(key[keyLength : keyLength+noncePrefixLength])
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decoder.sip = siphash.New(key[keyLength+noncePrefixLength:])
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return decoder
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}
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// Decode decodes a stream of data and returns the length if any. ErrAgain is
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// a temporary failure, all other errors MUST be treated as fatal and the
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// session aborted.
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func (decoder *Decoder) Decode(data []byte, frames *bytes.Buffer) (int, error) {
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// A length of 0 indicates that we do not know how big the next frame is
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// going to be.
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if decoder.nextLength == 0 {
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// Attempt to pull out the next frame length.
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if lengthLength > frames.Len() {
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return 0, ErrAgain
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}
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// Remove the length field from the buffer.
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var obfsLen [lengthLength]byte
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n, err := frames.Read(obfsLen[:])
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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} else if n != lengthLength {
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// Should *NEVER* happen, since at least 2 bytes exist.
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panic(fmt.Sprintf("BUG: Failed to read obfuscated length: %d", n))
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}
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// Derive the nonce the peer used.
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err = decoder.nonce.bytes(&decoder.nextNonce)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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}
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// Deobfuscate the length field.
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length := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(obfsLen[:])
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decoder.sip.Write(decoder.nextNonce[:])
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lengthMask := decoder.sip.Sum(nil)
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decoder.sip.Reset()
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length ^= binary.BigEndian.Uint16(lengthMask)
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if maxFrameLength < length || minFrameLength > length {
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// Per "Plaintext Recovery Attacks Against SSH" by
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// Martin R. Albrecht, Kenneth G. Paterson and Gaven J. Watson,
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// there are a class of attacks againt protocols that use similar
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// sorts of framing schemes.
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//
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// While obfs4 should not allow plaintext recovery (CBC mode is
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// not used), attempt to mitigate out of bound frame length errors
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// by pretending that the length was a random valid range as per
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// the countermeasure suggested by Denis Bider in section 6 of the
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// paper.
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decoder.nextLengthInvalid = true
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length = uint16(csrand.IntRange(minFrameLength, maxFrameLength))
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}
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decoder.nextLength = length
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}
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if int(decoder.nextLength) > frames.Len() {
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return 0, ErrAgain
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}
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// Unseal the frame.
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var box [maxFrameLength]byte
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n, err := frames.Read(box[:decoder.nextLength])
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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} else if n != int(decoder.nextLength) {
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// Should *NEVER* happen, since the length is checked.
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panic(fmt.Sprintf("BUG: Failed to read secretbox, got %d, should have %d",
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n, decoder.nextLength))
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}
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out, ok := secretbox.Open(data[:0], box[:n], &decoder.nextNonce, &decoder.key)
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if !ok || decoder.nextLengthInvalid {
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// When a random lenght is used (on length error) the tag should always
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// mismatch, but be paranoid.
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return 0, ErrTagMismatch
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}
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// Clean up and prepare for the next frame.
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decoder.nextLength = 0
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decoder.nonce.counter++
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return len(out), nil
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}
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/* vim :set ts=4 sw=4 sts=4 noet : */
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