mirror of
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229 lines
5.0 KiB
Plaintext
229 lines
5.0 KiB
Plaintext
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invisible wire protocol:
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as of version 0 dtls is used, future versions will use this encrypted udp
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transport protocol.
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
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document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
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cryptography:
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see crypto_v0.txt
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wire decryption:
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the first 32 bytes are message authentication bytes, h
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the next 32 bytes are nouce for cipher, n
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the remaining bytes are interpreted as ciphertext, x
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a shared secret S is generated in the session start message
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next the integrity of the ciphertext is done by checking MDS(n + x, S) == h
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if the ciphertext is valid then the frame is decrypted via SD(S, x, n)
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wire encryption:
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given variadic sized payload p, 32 byte nounce n and public encryption keys A
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and B
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x = SE(S, p, n[0:24])
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h = MDS(n + x, S)
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the resulting data is:
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h + n + x
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handshake:
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0) intro
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32 bytes hmac, h
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32 bytes nounce, n
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32 bytes encrypted alice's transport public encryption key e
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variadic bytes padding, w0
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Alice transmits ( h + n + e + w0 ) to Bob from the transport address matching
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his public transport encryption key (b.k).
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w0 = "[insert variable length random padding here]"
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n = RAND(32)
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e = SE(a.k, HS(b.k + n), n[0:24])
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S = TKE(a.k, b.k, n)
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h = MDS(n + e + w0, S)
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Bob recieves ( s + n + e + w0 )
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1) intro ack
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sent in reply to an intro, bob sends an intro ack encrypted to Alice using
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32 bytes hmac, h
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32 bytes nounce, n
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32 bytes ciphertext, x
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variadic bytes padding, w1
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w1 = "[insert variable length random padding here]"
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token = RAND(32)
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S = TKE(a.k, b.k, n)
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x = SE(k, token, n[0:24])
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h = MDS(n + x + w1, S)
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Bob transmits ( s + n + x + w1 ), r is ignored and discarded
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Alice recieves ( s + n + x + w1 ) and verifies the signature silently
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dropping if it does not match.
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2) session start
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Alice uses the token from the previous message to start the wire session
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32 bytes hmac, h
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32 bytes nounce, n
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32 bytes ciphertext, x
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variadic byttes padding, w2
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w2 = "[insert variable length random padding here]"
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e_K = TKE(a.k, b.k, n)
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x = SE(e_K, token, n[0:24])
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h = MDS(n + x + w2, e_K)
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T = HS(token + n)
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K = TKE(a.k, b.k, T)
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Alice transmits ( h + n + x + w2 )
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Bob recieves ( h + n + x + w2) and verifies that h == MDS(n + x, k) silently
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drops if not matching
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the session is now established with session key K,
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Bob replies by transmitting a LIM
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IWP payload format:
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ciphertext:
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32 bytes hmac, h
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32 bytes nounce, n
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N bytes of ciphertext, x
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plaintext header, H
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8 bits protocol version, v (currently 0)
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8 bits message type, t
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16 bits payload size, s
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8 bits reserved, r (currently 0)
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8 bits flags, f
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plaintext payload: P
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s bytes of data
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N bytes remaining data is discarded
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Encryption:
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D = H + P
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x = SE(D, S, n)
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h = MDS(n + x, S)
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Alice transmits h + n + x
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Bob recieves recieve h + n + x
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Bob checks hmac by verifying h == MDS(n + x, S)
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if the hmac fails the data is silently dropped
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Decryption:
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verify h == MDS(n + x, S)
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D = SD(x, S, n)
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H = D[0:4]
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P = D[4:4+H.s]
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message types:
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ALIV = 0x00
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keepalive message
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XMIT = 0x01
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begin link layer message transmission
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ACKS = 0x02
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acknolege link layer message fragment
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FRAG = 0x03
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transmit link layer message fragment
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flags:
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SESSION_INVALIDATED = 1 << 0
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this session is now invalidated and a new session is required
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HIGH_PACKET_DROP = 1 << 1
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high packet drop detected
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HIGH_MTU_DETECTED = 1 << 2
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the network uses an mtu greater than 1488 bytes
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PROTOCOL_UPGRADE = 1 << 3
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indicates we want to do protocol upgrade (future use)
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XMIT payload:
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start transmiting a link layer message
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msg_bytes = BE(msg)
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32 bytes hash of message computed by HS(msg_bytes)
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64 bits unsigned int message id
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16 bits unsigned int fragment size bytes, S
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16 bits size of last fragment in bytes, L
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16 bits reserved for future, currently zero
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8 bits unsigned int nonzero number of fragments, n
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8 bits reserved flags, f
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if f LSB is set then last fragment is included and is l bytes long
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f's LSB MUST be set as of protocol version 0.
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msg_bytes is S * (n - 1) + L bytes long
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FRAG payload:
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transmit a link layer message fragment
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64 bits message id
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8 bits unsigned int fragment number
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S bytes of payload fragment data
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remaining bytes discarded
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ACKS payload:
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indicates we which chunks we have recieved
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64 bits message id
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32 bits bitmask of chunks we have received
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remaining bytes discarded
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control flow:
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To transmit link message over an established session the transmitter sends an
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XMIT frame.
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In reply to an XMIT frame the recipiant MUST send an ACKS frame with an emtpy
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bitmask.
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After the transmitter recieves the first ACKS frame it is allowed to start
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sending FRAG messages.
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When all fragmenets are obtained by the recipiant, the recipiant sends an ACKS
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frame with a full bitfield (0xFFFF), to indicate the link message was recieved.
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In the event of packet drop the sender decides when to retransmit FRAG frames
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with expontential backoff.
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In the event of packet loss greater than 50% over 10 second the session is
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invalidated and must be renegotiated with a new handshake.
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