Archives
/
lokinet
mirror of https://github.com/oxen-io/lokinet
2
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Projects Releases Wiki Activity

more docs

Browse Source
pull/617/head
Jeff Becker 5 years ago
parent 5bcb205a9f
commit 7a5bb084da
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: F357B3B42F6F9B05
2 changed files with 65 additions and 26 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File

23
docs/dht_v0.txt
Unescape Escape View File

@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
DHT messages
these messages can be either wrapped in a LIDM message or sent anonymously over a path
DHT messages can be either wrapped in a LIDM message or sent anonymously over a path inside a DHT routing message
The distance function is distance = A ^ B
This document is currently out of date (probably)
The distance function is A xor B (traditional kademlia)
The dht implements both iterative and recursive lookups.
find introduction message (FIM)
@ -13,7 +12,7 @@ variant 1: find an IS by SA
{
A: "F",
R: 0 or 1 if recurisve request,
R: 0 for iterative and 1 for recurisve,
S: "<32 bytes SA>",
T: transaction_id_uint64,
V: 0
@ -24,12 +23,20 @@ variant 2: recursively find many IS in a tag
{
A: "F",
E: [list, of, excluded, SA],
R: 0 or 1 if recurisve request,
R: 0 for iterative and 1 for recurisve,
N: "<16 bytes topic tag>",
T: transaction_id_uint64,
V: 0
}
variant 3: find many IS by what services they advertise
{
A: "F",
H:
R: 0 for iterative and 1 for recurisve,
}
exclude adding service addresses in E if present
@ -77,8 +84,8 @@ As of protocol version 0, R is always 0.
If S is provided store the IS for later lookup unconditionally,
decrement S by 1 and forward to dht peer who is next closest to
the SA of the IS. If S is greater than 3, don't store and discard
this message.
the SA of the IS. If S is greater than 3, don't store the IS and
discard this message.
find router contact message (FRCM)

68
docs/proto_v0.txt
Unescape Escape View File

@ -73,11 +73,11 @@ An address info (AI) defines a publically reachable endpoint
v: 0
}
example iwp address info:
example wank address info:
{
c: 1,
d: "iwp",
d: "wank",
e: "<32 bytes of 0x61>",
i: "123.123.123.123",
p: 1234,
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ example iwp address info:
bencoded form:
d1:ci1e1:d3:iwp1:e32:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa1:d3:iwp1:i15:123.123.123.1231:pi1234e1:vi0ee
d1:ci1e1:d4:wank1:e32:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa1:d3:iwp1:i15:123.123.123.1231:pi1234e1:vi0ee
Traffic Policy (TP)
@ -135,16 +135,30 @@ router's full identity
{
a: [ one, or, many, AI, here ... ],
e: extensions_supported,
i: "<max 8 bytes network identifier>",
k: "<32 bytes public long term identity signing key>",
n: "<optional max 32 bytes router nickname>",
p: "<32 bytes public path encryption key>",
s: [services, supported],
u: time_signed_at_milliseconds_since_epoch_uint64,
v: 0,
x: [ Exit, Infos ],
z: "<64 bytes signature using identity key>"
}
e is a dict containing key/value of supported protocol extensions on this service node, keys are strings, values MUST be 0 or 1.
s is a list of services on this service node:
each service is a 6 item long, list of the following:
["_service", "_proto", ttl_uint, priority_uint, weight_uint, port_uint]
with the corrisponding SRV record:
<_service>.<_proto>.router_pubkey_goes_here.snode. <ttl_uint> IN SRV <priority_uint> <weight_uint> <port_uint> router_pubkey_goes_here.snode
RC.t is the timestamp of when this RC was signed.
RC is valid for a maximum of 1 hour after which it MUST be resigned with the new
@ -206,8 +220,9 @@ x is the timestamp milliseconds since epoch that this introduction expires at
introduction set (IS)
a signed set of introductions for a hidden service
and introset is a signed set of introductions for a hidden service
a is the service info of the publisher
h is a list of srv records in same format as in RCs
i is the list of introductions that this service is advertising with
k is the public key to use when doing encryption to this hidden service
n is a 16 byte null padded utf-8 encoded string tagging the hidden service in
@ -219,6 +234,7 @@ service's signing key.
{
a: SI,
h: [list, of, advertised, services],
i: [ I, I, I, ... ],
k: "<1218 bytes sntrup4591761 public key block>",
n: "<16 bytes service topic (optional)>",
@ -228,6 +244,17 @@ service's signing key.
z: "<64 bytes signature using service info signing key>"
}
h is a list of services on this endpoint
each service is a 7 item long, list of the following:
["_service", "_proto", ttl_uint, priority_uint, weight_uint, port_uint, "<32 bytes SA of the service>"]
with the corrisponding SRV record:
<_service>.<_proto>.<service_address>.loki. <ttl_uint> IN SRV <priority_uint> <weight_uint> <port_uint> <SA of sub service>.loki.
recursion on SRV records is NOT permitted.
---
@ -328,7 +355,7 @@ link relay commit record (LRCR)
record requesting relaying messages for 600 seconds to router
on network who's i is equal to RC.k and decrypt data any messages using
PKE(n, rc.K, c) as symettric key for encryption and decryption.
PKE(n, rc.p, c) as symettric key for encryption and decryption.
if l is provided and is less than 600 and greater than 10 then that lifespan
is used (in seconds) instead of 600 seconds.
@ -338,6 +365,7 @@ the path is extended by w.y seconds
{
c: "<32 byte public encryption key used for upstream>",
d: uint_optional_ms_delay,
i: "<32 byte RC.k of next hop>",
l: uint_optional_lifespan,
n: "<32 bytes nounce for key exchange>",
@ -446,6 +474,10 @@ transfer a state message between nodes
state message:
NOTE: this message type is currently a documentation stub and remains unimplemented.
state messages propagate changes to the service nodes concensous to thin clients.
service node joined network
{
@ -464,11 +496,11 @@ service node parted network
service node list request
request the service node list starting at index O containing R entries
request the service node list starting at index I containing R entries
{
A: "R",
O: starting_offset_int,
I: starting_offset_int,
R: number_of_entires_to_request_int,
V: 0
}
@ -480,8 +512,8 @@ response to service node list request
{
A: "L",
S: {
"<32 bytes pubkey>" : first_seen_time_uint64,
"<32 bytes pubkey>" : first_seen_time_uint64,
"<32 bytes pubkey>" : 1,
"<32 bytes pubkey>" : 1,
....
},
V: 0
@ -640,9 +672,9 @@ hidden service frame (HSF)
TODO: document this better
intro message (variant 1)
establish converstation tag message (variant 1)
start a new session
generate a new convotag that is contained inside an encrypted HSD
{
A: "H",
@ -650,6 +682,7 @@ start a new session
D: "<N bytes encrypted HSD>",
F: "<16 bytes source path_id>",
N: "<32 bytes nonce for key exchange>",
S: sequence_number,
V: 0,
Z: "<64 bytes signature of entire message using sender's signing key>"
}
@ -657,7 +690,7 @@ start a new session
alice (A) wants to talk to bob (B) over the network, both have hidden services
set up and are online on the network.
A and B are both SI.
A and B are both referring to alice and bob's SI respectively.
A_sk is alice's private signing key.
for alice (A) to send the string "beep" to bob (B), alice picks an introduction
@ -732,13 +765,12 @@ S = HS(K + PKE(A, B, sk, N))
given sk is the local secret encryption key used by the current hidden service
please note:
signature verification can only be done after decryption
TODO: explain bob's side too (it's invsere of alice's process)
signature verification of the outer message can only be done after decryption
because the signing keys are inside the encrypted HSD.
data from a previously made session (variant 2)
transfer data on a session previously made
transfer data on a converstation previously made
{
A: "H",
@ -759,13 +791,13 @@ transfer ip traffic
A: "I",
S: uint64_sequence_number,
V: 0,
X: "<list of ip packet buffers>",
X: [list, of, ip, packet, buffers],
}
an ip packet buffer is prefixed with a 64 bit big endian unsigned integer
denoting the sequence number for re-ordering followed by the ip packet itself.
X is parsed as a alist of IP packet buffers.
X is parsed as a list of IP packet buffers.
for each ip packet the source addresss is extracted and sent on the
appropriate network interface.

Write Preview
Loading…
Cancel
Save