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Made one sentence out of these two.
Someone better versed in the noise protocol may consider including 'authentication' and 'identity privacy', so that the glossary information on the noise protocol is parallel to [the one in ch.3](https://github.com/lnbook/lnbook/blob/develop/03_how_ln_works.asciidoc): >The Noise Protocol Framework allows the construction of cryptographic communication protocols that offer authentication, encryption, forward secrecy and identity privacy.
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@ -302,8 +302,7 @@ Noise_XK::
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The template of the Noise protocol framework to establish an authenticated and encrypted communication channel between two peers of the Lightning Network.
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X means that no public key needs to be known from the initiator of the connection.
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K means that the public key of the receiver needs to be known.
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More particular (from: http://www.noiseprotocol.org/noise.html) the protocol enables.
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Encryption to a known recipient, strong forward secrecy. This payload is encrypted based on an ephemeral-ephemeral DH as well as an ephemeral-static DH with the recipient's static key pair. Assuming the ephemeral private keys are secure, and the recipient is not being actively impersonated by an attacker that has stolen its static private key, this payload cannot be decrypted. Sender authentication resistant to key-compromise impersonation (KCI). The sender authentication is based on an ephemeral-static DH ("es" or "se") between the sender's static key pair and the recipient's ephemeral key pair. Assuming the corresponding private keys are secure, this authentication cannot be forged.
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More particular (from: http://www.noiseprotocol.org/noise.html) the protocol enables encryption to a known recipient and strong forward secrecy. This payload is encrypted based on an ephemeral-ephemeral DH as well as an ephemeral-static DH with the recipient's static key pair. Assuming the ephemeral private keys are secure, and the recipient is not being actively impersonated by an attacker that has stolen its static private key, this payload cannot be decrypted. Sender authentication resistant to key-compromise impersonation (KCI). The sender authentication is based on an ephemeral-static DH ("es" or "se") between the sender's static key pair and the recipient's ephemeral key pair. Assuming the corresponding private keys are secure, this authentication cannot be forged.
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// the noise protocol documentation is according to their IPR section public domain. The author is Trevor Perrin (noise@trevp.net)
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onion routing::
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