diff --git a/onion-routing-htlc-forwarding.asciidoc b/onion-routing-htlc-forwarding.asciidoc
index acb7e57..b700e25 100644
--- a/onion-routing-htlc-forwarding.asciidoc
+++ b/onion-routing-htlc-forwarding.asciidoc
@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ The malicious nodes can then capture the data of all packets that pass through t
 With additional information, such as the names of the other routing nodes, it could infer who is making these payments, who is receiving them, and for what amounts.
 footnote:[Note that not all Lightning nodes are anonymous.
 It is known, for example, that the nodes "aantonop" and "1.ln.aantonop.com" are owned by the author of this book Andreas Antonopolous.
-Furthermore, many companies and businesses in this space use a publicly known name for their routing nodes.
-If we see, for example, a payment with destination "Bitrefill", we could infer that someone is making a purchase from Bitrefill.
+Furthermore, companies and businesses in this space can claim ownership of a node by publicizing their node's alias and pubkey on their website or social media
+If we see, for example, a payment with destination "Bitrefill" with a node pubkey that matches Bitrefill's publicized pubkey, we could infer that someone is making a purchase from Bitrefill.
 If we know the prices of their services, we could even infer what they purchased. ]
 If it has multiple routing nodes connected to each other, it might even be responsible for transmitting several of the hops in a single payment and could form a more complete picture of the route.
 We see this example as spiritually similar to the chain analysis already performed on the Bitcoin network; even an incomplete picture of payments can be used to infer things about the parties involved and potentially de-anonymize them.