From 25de2edda1296af25d0e956718db92bd9d3c62e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Imran <60175113+ImranLorgat@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 30 Aug 2020 16:43:28 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Update 03_how_ln_works.asciidoc

---
 03_how_ln_works.asciidoc | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/03_how_ln_works.asciidoc b/03_how_ln_works.asciidoc
index 52bc107..603a880 100644
--- a/03_how_ln_works.asciidoc
+++ b/03_how_ln_works.asciidoc
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ If there is any balance allocated to you, you will have to pay on-chain fees to
 
 As with a force close, all pending routing attempts will also have to be resolved in the commitment transaction.
 
-A Protocol Breach can be executed faster than a mutual close, as you do not need to agree to a close with your partner or wait for routing attempts to resolve or expire, and faster than a force close as you do not need to wait for your timelock to expire.
+A Protocol Breach can be executed faster than a mutual close, as you do not wait to negotiate a close with your partner, and faster than a force close as you do not need to wait for your timelock to expire.
 
 Game theory predicts that cheating is not an appealing strategy because it is easy to detect a cheater, and the cheater risks losing _all_ of their funds while only standing to gain what they had in an earlier state.
 Furthermore, as the Lightning Network matures, and watchtowers become widely available, cheaters will be able to be detected by a third party even if the cheated channel partner is offline.