The state machine makes sure that both af and addr are written to before
they are being read. However, to silence compiler warnings, it does not
hurt to explicitly initialize af and addr anyway. This gets rid of the
following spurious compiler warnings:
opts.c: In function 'proxyspec_parse':
opts.c:380:8: warning: 'af' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
af = sys_sockaddr_parse(&spec->connect_addr,
^
opts.c:316:8: warning: 'addr' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
af = sys_sockaddr_parse(&spec->listen_addr,
^
Reported by: Thomas Klausner
Issue: #78
- Update copyright to 2015
- Remove the non-standard "unmodified" from the 2-clause BSD license
- Remove scalable from the tagline to avoid misinterpretations
Fork into a monitor parent process and an actual proxy child process,
communicating over AF_UNIX sockets. Certain privileged operations are
performed through the privileged parent process, like opening log files
or listener sockets, while all other operations happen in the child
process, which can now drop its privileges without side-effects for
log file opening and other privileged operations. This is also a
preparation for -l/-L logfile reopening through SIGUSR1.
This means that -S and -F are no longer relative to chroot() if used
with -j. This is a deliberate POLA violation.
Add -r to force a specific SSL/TLS protocol version.
Add -R to disable one or several SSL/TLS protocol versions.
Replace WANT_SSLV2_CLIENT and WANT_SSLV2_SERVER to WITH_SSLV2.
Issue: #30
Reported by: @Apollo2342
