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SSLproxy/privsep.h

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Update with SSLsplit 0.5.2 and develop branch changes as of 270218
2018-02-27 19:20:58 +00:00
/*-
Update copyright, license and tagline - Update copyright to 2015 - Remove the non-standard "unmodified" from the 2-clause BSD license - Remove scalable from the tagline to avoid misinterpretations
2015-02-24 18:19:20 +00:00
* SSLsplit - transparent SSL/TLS interception
Update with SSLsplit 0.5.2 and develop branch changes as of 270218
2018-02-27 19:20:58 +00:00
* https://www.roe.ch/SSLsplit
*
* Copyright (c) 2009-2018, Daniel Roethlisberger <daniel@roe.ch>.
Introduce privilege separation architecture Fork into a monitor parent process and an actual proxy child process, communicating over AF_UNIX sockets. Certain privileged operations are performed through the privileged parent process, like opening log files or listener sockets, while all other operations happen in the child process, which can now drop its privileges without side-effects for log file opening and other privileged operations. This is also a preparation for -l/-L logfile reopening through SIGUSR1. This means that -S and -F are no longer relative to chroot() if used with -j. This is a deliberate POLA violation.
2014-11-24 21:01:52 +00:00
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
Update with SSLsplit 0.5.2 and develop branch changes as of 270218
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
Introduce privilege separation architecture Fork into a monitor parent process and an actual proxy child process, communicating over AF_UNIX sockets. Certain privileged operations are performed through the privileged parent process, like opening log files or listener sockets, while all other operations happen in the child process, which can now drop its privileges without side-effects for log file opening and other privileged operations. This is also a preparation for -l/-L logfile reopening through SIGUSR1. This means that -S and -F are no longer relative to chroot() if used with -j. This is a deliberate POLA violation.
2014-11-24 21:01:52 +00:00
*
Update with SSLsplit 0.5.2 and develop branch changes as of 270218
2018-02-27 19:20:58 +00:00
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS''
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
Introduce privilege separation architecture Fork into a monitor parent process and an actual proxy child process, communicating over AF_UNIX sockets. Certain privileged operations are performed through the privileged parent process, like opening log files or listener sockets, while all other operations happen in the child process, which can now drop its privileges without side-effects for log file opening and other privileged operations. This is also a preparation for -l/-L logfile reopening through SIGUSR1. This means that -S and -F are no longer relative to chroot() if used with -j. This is a deliberate POLA violation.
2014-11-24 21:01:52 +00:00
*/
#ifndef PRIVSEP_H
#define PRIVSEP_H
#include "attrib.h"
#include "opts.h"
int privsep_fork(opts_t *, int[], size_t);
int privsep_client_openfile(int, const char *, int);
int privsep_client_opensock(int, const proxyspec_t *spec);
Rename and clean-up
2017-07-12 21:45:12 +00:00
int privsep_client_opensock_child(int, const proxyspec_t *spec);
Move cert writer to logger thread using privsep Make -w and -W work in conjunction with dropping privileges and chrooting by moving the cert writer code to a separate logger thread and using the privsep framework to open the files if they do not exist already. Issue: #70
2014-12-13 22:52:17 +00:00
int privsep_client_certfile(int, const char *);
Introduce privilege separation architecture Fork into a monitor parent process and an actual proxy child process, communicating over AF_UNIX sockets. Certain privileged operations are performed through the privileged parent process, like opening log files or listener sockets, while all other operations happen in the child process, which can now drop its privileges without side-effects for log file opening and other privileged operations. This is also a preparation for -l/-L logfile reopening through SIGUSR1. This means that -S and -F are no longer relative to chroot() if used with -j. This is a deliberate POLA violation.
2014-11-24 21:01:52 +00:00
int privsep_client_close(int);
Redirect user to login page and redirect again to orig target after successful authentication, currently supported only on OpenBSD Get ethernet address and compare with the one in userdb, on each conn setup Create user_auth options Rename and clean-up
2019-02-28 23:08:24 +00:00
int privsep_client_update_atime(int, const userdbkeys_t *);
Introduce privilege separation architecture Fork into a monitor parent process and an actual proxy child process, communicating over AF_UNIX sockets. Certain privileged operations are performed through the privileged parent process, like opening log files or listener sockets, while all other operations happen in the child process, which can now drop its privileges without side-effects for log file opening and other privileged operations. This is also a preparation for -l/-L logfile reopening through SIGUSR1. This means that -S and -F are no longer relative to chroot() if used with -j. This is a deliberate POLA violation.
2014-11-24 21:01:52 +00:00
#endif /* !PRIVSEP_H */
/* vim: set noet ft=c: */
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