Cloak/internal/multiplex/obfs.go

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package multiplex
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import (
"crypto/aes"
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"crypto/cipher"
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"encoding/binary"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"github.com/cbeuw/Cloak/internal/common"
"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
"golang.org/x/crypto/salsa20"
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)
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type Obfser func(*Frame, []byte, int) (int, error)
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type Deobfser func([]byte) (*Frame, error)
var u32 = binary.BigEndian.Uint32
var u64 = binary.BigEndian.Uint64
var putU32 = binary.BigEndian.PutUint32
var putU64 = binary.BigEndian.PutUint64
const HEADER_LEN = 14
const salsa20NonceSize = 8
const (
E_METHOD_PLAIN = iota
E_METHOD_AES_GCM
E_METHOD_CHACHA20_POLY1305
)
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// Obfuscator is responsible for the obfuscation and deobfuscation of frames
type Obfuscator struct {
// Used in Stream.Write. Add multiplexing headers, encrypt and add TLS header
Obfs Obfser
// Remove TLS header, decrypt and unmarshall frames
Deobfs Deobfser
SessionKey [32]byte
maxOverhead int
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}
// MakeObfs returns a function of type Obfser. An Obfser takes three arguments:
// a *Frame with all the field set correctly, a []byte as buffer to put encrypted
// message in, and an int called payloadOffsetInBuf to be used when *Frame.payload
// is in the byte slice used as buffer (2nd argument). payloadOffsetInBuf specifies
// the index at which data belonging to *Frame.Payload starts in the buffer.
func MakeObfs(salsaKey [32]byte, payloadCipher cipher.AEAD) Obfser {
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// The method here is to use the first payloadCipher.NonceSize() bytes of the serialised frame header
// as iv/nonce for the AEAD cipher to encrypt the frame payload. Then we use
// the authentication tag produced appended to the end of the ciphertext (of size payloadCipher.Overhead())
// as nonce for Salsa20 to encrypt the frame header. Both with SessionKey as keys.
//
// Several cryptographic guarantees we have made here: that payloadCipher, as an AEAD, is given a unique
// iv/nonce each time, relative to its key; that the frame header encryptor Salsa20 is given a unique
// nonce each time, relative to its key; and that the authenticity of frame header is checked.
//
// The payloadCipher is given a unique iv/nonce each time because it is derived from the frame header, which
// contains the monotonically increasing stream id (uint32) and frame sequence (uint64). There will be a nonce
// reuse after 2^64-1 frames sent (sent, not received because frames going different ways are sequenced
// independently) by a stream, or after 2^32-1 streams created in a single session. We consider these number
// to be large enough that they may never happen in reasonable time frames. Of course, different sessions
// will produce the same combination of stream id and frame sequence, but they will have different session keys.
//
// Salsa20 is assumed to be given a unique nonce each time because we assume the tags produced by payloadCipher
// AEAD is unique each time, as payloadCipher itself is given a unique iv/nonce each time due to points made above.
// This is relatively a weak guarantee as we are assuming AEADs to produce different tags given different iv/nonces.
// This is almost certainly true but I cannot find a source that outright states this.
//
// Because the frame header, before it being encrypted, is fed into the AEAD, it is also authenticated.
// (rfc5116 s.2.1 "The nonce is authenticated internally to the algorithm").
//
// In case the user chooses to not encrypt the frame payload, payloadCipher will be nil. In this scenario,
// we pad the frame payload with random bytes until it reaches Salsa20's nonce size (8 bytes). Then we simply
// encrypt the frame header with the last 8 bytes of frame payload as nonce.
// If the payload provided by the user is greater than 8 bytes, then we use entirely the user input as nonce.
// We can't ensure its uniqueness ourselves, which is why plaintext mode must only be used when the user input
// is already random-like. For Cloak it would normally mean that the user is using a proxy protocol that sends
// encrypted data.
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obfs := func(f *Frame, buf []byte, payloadOffsetInBuf int) (int, error) {
payloadLen := len(f.Payload)
if payloadLen == 0 {
return 0, errors.New("payload cannot be empty")
}
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var extraLen int
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if payloadCipher == nil {
extraLen = salsa20NonceSize - payloadLen
if extraLen < 0 {
// if our payload is already greater than 8 bytes
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extraLen = 0
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}
} else {
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extraLen = payloadCipher.Overhead()
if extraLen < salsa20NonceSize {
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return 0, errors.New("AEAD's Overhead cannot be fewer than 8 bytes")
}
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}
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usefulLen := HEADER_LEN + payloadLen + extraLen
if len(buf) < usefulLen {
return 0, errors.New("obfs buffer too small")
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}
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// we do as much in-place as possible to save allocation
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payload := buf[HEADER_LEN : HEADER_LEN+payloadLen]
if payloadOffsetInBuf != HEADER_LEN {
// if payload is not at the correct location in buffer
copy(payload, f.Payload)
}
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header := buf[:HEADER_LEN]
putU32(header[0:4], f.StreamID)
putU64(header[4:12], f.Seq)
header[12] = f.Closing
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header[13] = byte(extraLen)
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if payloadCipher == nil {
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if extraLen != 0 { // read nonce
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extra := buf[usefulLen-extraLen : usefulLen]
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common.CryptoRandRead(extra)
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}
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} else {
payloadCipher.Seal(payload[:0], header[:payloadCipher.NonceSize()], payload, nil)
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}
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nonce := buf[usefulLen-salsa20NonceSize : usefulLen]
salsa20.XORKeyStream(header, header, nonce, &salsaKey)
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return usefulLen, nil
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}
return obfs
}
// MakeDeobfs returns a function Deobfser. A Deobfser takes in a single byte slice,
// containing the message to be decrypted, and returns a *Frame containing the frame
// information and plaintext
func MakeDeobfs(salsaKey [32]byte, payloadCipher cipher.AEAD) Deobfser {
// stream header length + minimum data size (i.e. nonce size of salsa20)
const minInputLen = HEADER_LEN + salsa20NonceSize
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deobfs := func(in []byte) (*Frame, error) {
if len(in) < minInputLen {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("input size %v, but it cannot be shorter than %v bytes", len(in), minInputLen)
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}
header := in[:HEADER_LEN]
pldWithOverHead := in[HEADER_LEN:] // payload + potential overhead
nonce := in[len(in)-salsa20NonceSize:]
salsa20.XORKeyStream(header, header, nonce, &salsaKey)
streamID := u32(header[0:4])
seq := u64(header[4:12])
closing := header[12]
extraLen := header[13]
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usefulPayloadLen := len(pldWithOverHead) - int(extraLen)
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if usefulPayloadLen < 0 || usefulPayloadLen > len(pldWithOverHead) {
return nil, errors.New("extra length is negative or extra length is greater than total pldWithOverHead length")
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}
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var outputPayload []byte
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if payloadCipher == nil {
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if extraLen == 0 {
outputPayload = pldWithOverHead
} else {
outputPayload = pldWithOverHead[:usefulPayloadLen]
}
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} else {
_, err := payloadCipher.Open(pldWithOverHead[:0], header[:payloadCipher.NonceSize()], pldWithOverHead, nil)
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if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
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outputPayload = pldWithOverHead[:usefulPayloadLen]
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}
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ret := &Frame{
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StreamID: streamID,
Seq: seq,
Closing: closing,
Payload: outputPayload,
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}
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return ret, nil
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}
return deobfs
}
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func MakeObfuscator(encryptionMethod byte, sessionKey [32]byte) (obfuscator Obfuscator, err error) {
obfuscator = Obfuscator{
SessionKey: sessionKey,
}
var payloadCipher cipher.AEAD
switch encryptionMethod {
case E_METHOD_PLAIN:
payloadCipher = nil
obfuscator.maxOverhead = salsa20NonceSize
case E_METHOD_AES_GCM:
var c cipher.Block
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c, err = aes.NewCipher(sessionKey[:])
if err != nil {
return
}
payloadCipher, err = cipher.NewGCM(c)
if err != nil {
return
}
obfuscator.maxOverhead = payloadCipher.Overhead()
case E_METHOD_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
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payloadCipher, err = chacha20poly1305.New(sessionKey[:])
if err != nil {
return
}
obfuscator.maxOverhead = payloadCipher.Overhead()
default:
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return obfuscator, errors.New("Unknown encryption method")
}
if payloadCipher != nil {
if payloadCipher.NonceSize() > HEADER_LEN {
return obfuscator, errors.New("payload AEAD's nonce size cannot be greater than size of frame header")
}
}
obfuscator.Obfs = MakeObfs(sessionKey, payloadCipher)
obfuscator.Deobfs = MakeDeobfs(sessionKey, payloadCipher)
return
}